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Abstract: 
South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not 
an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, 
regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both 
countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to 
obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 
1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic 
institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to 
the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the 
building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are 
once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is 
better developed when democratic regimes are in place.	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Introduction 
 
South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not 
an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, 
regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both 
countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to 
obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game due to old 
mistrust and rivalries. However, before these countries managed to acquire such 
weapons historical events thwarted such ambitions. In the late 1970s, still under 
military dictatorships, the first signs of an entente emerged with Argentina supporting 
Brazil on the nuclear treaty with Germany and the agreement among Brazil, 
Argentina and Paraguay on the use of electricity generated from the waters of shared 
rivers. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships, in themselves political 
phenomena related to Cold War contexts, and the successful establishing of 
democratic institutions put an end to the race. 
Physicists from both countries, through their associations, played a role in this 
by suggesting and beginning mutual inspections related to nuclear developments. In 
December 1983 the Brazilian Physics Society (SBF, in Portuguese) and the Argentine 
Physics Association (AFA, in Spanish), through their presidents Fernando de Souza 
Barros and Luis Másperi, signed a declaration asking their governments for an 
agreement concerning collaboration and mutual control on nuclear issues. These 
initiatives were followed by positions adopted by the new civil governments, under 
the leadership of José Sarney in Brazil and Raúl Alfonsín in Argentina. Ultimately 
this led to a treaty between the two countries allowing mutual inspections. Nowadays, 
restrictions on the use of nuclear technologies for pacific purposes alone figure in the 
laws of these countries. The case of Brazil and Argentina illustrates the value of 
scientists’ pursuit towards both the pacific uses of nuclear resources and autonomy in 
nuclear technology, which have been a contentious issue since the end of WWII. This 
achievement was a result of the historical development of both countries. Its 
preservation is a challenge for their future histories.  
 Argentine and Brazilian physicists were not alone in their quest for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indeed they were part of a tradition dating back to 
the very moment when the first atomic weapons were ready for use in the US, in mid 
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1945, with Nazi Germany defeated and the war in Europe over. The physicist Niels 
Bohr approached British and American authorities at the end of WWII to try, 
unsuccessfully, to convince them to share the new knowledge with the former Allies 
and the United Nations to foster mutual trust in the new world order (Rhodes, 1986, p. 
527) Scientists and technicians at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago led by Leo 
Szilard petitioned to the US President for wise consideration of the moral 
responsibilities implied in the use of atomic bombs against Japan.1 It was also the case 
of Joseph Rotblat, who left the Manhattan Project at the end of 1944. He objected to 
its further development once it had become clear that Germany was no longer able to 
pursue the building of atomic bombs. None of these voices were heeded and the 
newly created atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese towns of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki as part of the ongoing war in the Pacific. In the second half of the 20th 
century the world was involved in an arms race, with the US and former USSR 
leading the dispute, which brought the world to the brink of an unprecedented war. 
Meanwhile scientists made various attempts to look for control of such weapons. 
Among such initiatives, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, the Open Letter to the United 
Nations, written by Bohr, and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World 
Affairs are worth mentioning. Thus, it is not by chance that an early draft of this paper 
was presented at the international conference “An Open World: Science, Technology 
and Society in the Light of Niels Bohr's Thoughts”, held in Copenhagen 4-6 
December 2013.2 Such a conference seemed to us the appropriate place to bring the 
experiences of Argentina and Brazil in nuclear issues to the consideration of the 
international community. The first section of this paper presents a brief review of the 
history of nuclear physics in both countries. The second section examines the rivalries 
and the following détente between the two countries. The third section deals with the 
collaboration and the role played by Argentine and Brazilian physicists in this story 
while the fourth section presents the agreement of mutual inspections as the main 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Szilard also moved in the same direction as Bohr (Rhodes, 1986, p. 635). The 
petition led by Szilard is mentioned by Rhodes (1986, p. 697) and its full text is 
available at http://www.dannen.com/decision/45-07-17.html. Accessed on 10 May 
2015. 
2 See http://bohr-conference2013.ku.dk/, accessed on 10 May 2015. On the Open 
World letter by Bohr in the 1950s, see Aaserud (2007). 
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achievement of the two countries. The epilogue reflects on the relationship between 
nuclear issues and authoritarian regimes and updates the developments in the 
collaboration between the two countries. 
 
Nuclear science in Argentina and Brazil 
 
Argentina 
 
Physics in Argentina has its roots in the creation of Physics Institute of the National 
University of La Plata (1906, Buenos Aires province). At this time Richard Gans –
former professor of electromagnetism at University of Tübingen – headed the La 
Plata Physics Institute (1912-1925) from where the first group of Argentine physicists 
emerged. The leading figure of this group was Enrique Gaviola who had studied in 
Göttingen and received his doctorate in physics in Berlin in 1926 under the 
supervision of Peter Pringsheim.3  
However, the Argentine physics community grew slowly. In the early 1940s, 
there were around fifteen physicists in Argentina, including advanced graduate 
students. Interested in attracting top foreign scientists, Gaviola – then director of the 
National Observatory of Córdoba – was able to obtain permanent residence in 
Argentina for the anti-fascist Austrian physicist Guido Beck, a former assistant to 
Heisenberg, who arrived in Argentina in May 1943 (Videira 2001: 160–67). Gaviola 
and Beck helped set up the Argentine Physics Association (APA) in 1944 and 
immediately after the news of the atomic explosions in Japan, saw the nuclear issue as 
an opportunity to promote experimental nuclear physics in Argentina (Hurtado de 
Mendoza, 2005: 288–91). During the period 1950-51 the Comisión Nacional de 
Energía Atómica (CNEA) and the Dirección Nacional de Energía Atómica (DNEA) 
were created. Both institutions focused mainly on the physics of accelerators and 
reactors, metallurgy, cosmic rays, radiochemistry, and on exploring and prospecting 
for resources of nuclear raw materials.4  
At the beginning of 1952, the Argentine government signed a contract with 
Philips of Eindhoven to purchase a 28 MV synchrocyclotron for deuterons, then a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 On Gaviola’s trajectory, see Bernaola 2001. 
4 After 1956 both institutions were merged. 
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leading instrument for nuclear physics research, and a 1 MeV Cockroft-Walton 
accelerator, a not-so-modern but easy to use instrument (Mariscotti, 1990: 23). A 
member of CNEA’s laboratory in charge of assembling the machines later wrote: 
 
[W]e jumped from the typical university laboratory, where an oscilloscope 
was considered a luxury item, to a shielded steel-and-concrete room with 
double-walled tanks containing tones of water, and accommodating huge 
blocks of iron, aluminum, steel, electric generators and control instruments 
such as we had never seen before in a facility exclusively devoted to 
scientific research in Argentina (Mayo, 1981: 53). 
 
Crucial organizational initiatives during those early years were the creation of 
the Metallurgy and Reactor Divisions and the Instituto de Física de Bariloche (today 
Instituto Balseiro, Río Negro province). Jorge Sabato, a high-school teacher of 
physics was appointed head of the Metallurgy Division. He was later recognized as 
the main designer of Argentine nuclear policy and a regional reference on 
technological policies for development. 5 
 
Brazil 
 
After WWII Brazil had a small but active community doing research in physics. This 
community had been trained in the 1930s by the Russian-Italian physicist Gleb 
Wataghin, who had come to São Paulo to set up the physics department at the newly 
founded Universidade de São Paulo. Their initial work focused on cosmic rays, thus 
on high energy nuclear physics, and they received international acknowledgment in 
the late 1930s (Videira and Bustamante, 1993; Freire Jr. and Silva, 2014). The first 
Brazilian physicists to work on nuclear physics came from this group, among them 
Cesare Lattes, Marcelo Damy, Paulus Pompeia, and later Oscar Sala. Lattes gained an 
international reputation as an outstanding experimental physicist after his work on the 
discovery of pi-mesons. Sala built an electrostatic Van de Graff accelerator in São 
Paulo with support from the Rockefeller Foundation. Brazilian physicists and 
chemists were also trained abroad, as was the case of José Leite Lopes, Jayme 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 On Sabato’s thinking, see (Sabato 2014). 
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Tiomno, Hervásio de Carvalho, Sergio Porto, Roberto Salmeron, and Ernst 
Hamburger, among others.6 
 Government interest in nuclear energy followed the WWII, mainly due to the 
fact that Brazil had reserves of nuclear fuels such as thorium and uranium. In 1947, 
during the debates in the Atomic Energy Commission at the United Nations, Brazilian 
authorities were driven by the statement that, 
  
Nothing justifies the thesis of a restrictive international policy, capable of 
summarily depriving nations possessing the raw materials from which 
nuclear fuels are extracted from the right to utilize them in a peaceful 
manner, since a similar policy does not apply to other natural sources of 
hydro energy, also unequally distributed in the several regions of Earth.7 
  
 Thus there was a confluence of interests among government and scientists 
which was driven towards research on nuclear science. This common ground was also 
shared by the military and nationalist politicians and businessmen and helps explain 
the creation of new research institutes and funding agencies, such as the Centro 
Brasileiro de Pesquisas Físicas (CBPF), in Rio de Janeiro in 1949, the Conselho 
Nacional de Pesquisas (CNPQ) in 1951, and the Comissão Nacional de Energia 
Nuclear (CNEN), in 1956.8 
 
After WWII – Increasing rivalries 
 
The interest in nuclear physics in Argentina and Brazil was motivated not only by its 
peaceful uses. The nuclear weapons used by the US in 1945 to force Japan to accept 
its defeat in WWII provoked worldwide military interest in nuclear technology. Brazil 
and Argentina joined the race, achieving significant results. Their attempts to acquire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 On Lattes’ work, see (Vieira & Videira 2014). On the evolution of Brazilian science 
in the mid-20th century, see (Schwartzman 1991).  
7 Minutes of the Tenth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council – August 
27 1947 – Rio de Janeiro; available at 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116912. Accessed on 10 May 2015. 
8 On the founding of the CBPF, see Andrade (1998). 
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the full cycle of nuclear technology were accentuated under military regimes of the 
1960-1980 decades. Old mistrust and regional rivalries could become tragedies if 
nuclear ambitions were to become a part of the old disputes.9 
 
 
 
 
Press coverage reflecting rivalries between Argentina and Brazil 
 
 
Both Argentina’s and Brazil’s initiatives were revealed by the military when 
civilian regimes took over in both countries. During the 1970s, Argentina began a 
succession of increasingly ambitious projects –none of which finally materialized– at 
the Ezeiza Research Complex in Buenos Aires. In November 1983, three weeks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Examples of rivalry and mistrust are expressed in the following newspapers: La 
Nación, 12 August 1967 and 8 July 1968; Jornal do Brasil, 27 November 1990 and 29 
November 1990. For a scholarly treatment of the relationship between Brazil and 
Argentina, see Fausto and Devoto (2004). 
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before Alfonsín took office, the Argentine military government announced the 
existence of its unsafeguarded gaseous diffusion facility, which had been built by the 
firm INVAP, a spin-off from Argentina Atomic Energy Commission at Pilcaniyeu 
(Patagonia). During its first year the plant produced a few tons of slightly enriched 
uranium. Brazil´s major attempt to create an autonomous nuclear-enrichment facility 
was a gas centrifuge plant set-up by its Navy at Aramar, with the active collaboration 
of its Nuclear Energy Commission, and its National Research Council, i.e., with the 
Brazilian University Research Laboratories in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The 
Aramar facility started operating in 1982, but full disclosure occurred only in 1988, 
on its public inauguration.10 
 
 
The détente 
 
While regional competitors, Brazil and Argentina faced the same obstacles any 
developing country has faced in acquiring nuclear technological autonomy. These 
circumstances may have led the two countries to a kind of tacit agreement since the 
late 1960s. Indeed tensions between the two countries enhanced due to another source 
of energy; hydraulic power. In 1973 Brazil and Paraguay signed a treaty to exploit the 
Paraná river by building the Itaipu dam in a location not far from Argentina and thus 
putting the Argentine design of a dam in Corpus at risk. Two years later, Brazil signed 
a massive agreement with Germany (DDR) to build nuclear plants and for 
technological transfer, which led to increased American pressure against such an 
agreement. Argentine diplomacy then moved to support Brazil in international 
forums. 
At that time the Argentine physicist Jorge Sabato claimed that there were good 
reasons to suspect that the behavior of the US was motivated not for fear of nuclear 
proliferation but to obtain monopolistic control of the nuclear market. Furthermore, 
Sabato argued that such international interests had created favorable conditions for 
collaboration between Brazil and Argentina, which could counter the pressures then 
on Brazil but in the future on Argentina. Sabato closed his statement citing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 On the history of nuclear energy in Argentina and Brazil, see, for instance, Hurtado 
(2005), Hurtado and Vara (2006), and Andrade (2006) and references herein cited. 
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Brazilian sociologist Helio Jaguaribe who had written that the key for Latin American 
independence is agreement between Brazil and Argentina and the key for such an 
agreement is nuclear cooperation. (Sabato, 1977: 13, 17).   
As a matter of fact, the tension about the hydroelectric power plant, Itaipu, on 
the Paraná river was attenuated and eventually led to the 1979 tripartite treaty among 
Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay about the mutual rights on the shared rivers and 
opened a new era in the relationships between Brazil and Argentina (Redick, 1995: 
19-20; Escudé, 1986: 47-49). 
 
 
Collaboration among physicists 
 
In the early 1980s, with the weakening of the military dictatorships in the two 
countries, physicists from the two countries appealed for collaboration and mutual 
inspections. In December 1983, the Brazilian Physics Society (SBF, in Portuguese) 
and the Argentine Physics Association (AFA, in Spanish), through their presidents 
Fernando de Souza Barros and Luis Másperi, signed a declaration asking their 
governments for an agreement concerning collaboration and mutual control on 
nuclear issues (Másperi, 1999: 189). On January 11 of the following year, the AFA 
published a statement supporting the new President of Argentina Raul Alfonsín and 
the democratic government to engage itself in the international forums on the pacific 
use of nuclear energy and interrupt the military interference in nuclear matters. 
(Regionales, 1984). 
Commitments both to the pacific uses of nuclear energy as well as to the 
challenge of technological autonomy have been long lasting endeavors of Brazilian 
and Argentine physicists. These date back to the early cooperation between physicists 
from the two countries in 1945 under the leadership of Guido Beck and Gleb 
Wataghin. They endured until 1990 when the two countries finally cleared up any 
remaining doubts about their pacific commitments.11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Opinião, 03 October 1975; Jornal do Brasil, 23 November 1983, 27 December 
1986, 16 July 1987, 29 May 1988 and 19 August 1988. On the cooperation among 
physicists, (Hurtado y Souza, 2008). For the final pacific commitments, Jornal do 
Brasil, 27 November 1990 and 29 November 1990.  
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In July 1984, at the meeting of the Latin American Federation of Physics 
Societies, held in São Paulo, Brazil, a declaration by the Brazilian, Argentine, and 
Mexican societies was signed in favor of nuclear disarmament and mutual inspections 
and controls in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since then, the Argentine and 
Brazilian societies began to issue a joint annual declaration favoring mutual control 
on nuclear matters. Such declarations played their role among the public and 
reinforced the direction that the Brazilian and Argentine governments were working 
towards a joint nuclear policy (Wrobel & Redick, 2006: 176). 
 
 
The agreement of mutual inspections 
 
Military dictatorships in Latin America ended before the end of the Cold War, which 
had provided the external context supporting such political regimes. Indeed the days 
of these dictatorships were counted because of the waning of their legitimacy as 
consequence of various crises (economic, military, etc) and rising democratic 
opposition to them. Democracy brought Brazil and Argentina closer and the nuclear 
issue became a subject of heightened collaboration. In November 30, 1985, presidents 
Raúl Alfonsin and José Sarney met in Iguaçu Falls to widen collaboration between the 
two countries. From that meeting the “Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policies” was 
drawn up and a working team of diplomats, scientists and technicians was created. 
After 8 months of trading several protocols were signed and Alfonsín invited Sarney 
to visit the uranium enrichment plant in Pilcaniyeu (Escudé, 1986: 48-49). The 
following year both presidents visited the Brazilian uranium enrichment plant in 
Iperó, which resulted from the Brazilian parallel nuclear program under the leadership 
of the navy and the Argentine plant of reprocessing of plutonium being built in Ezeiza 
(Ornstein, 1988: 136-140). 
In the late 1980s, Argentine-Brazilian agreements were not weakened with the 
election of new presidents. In 1990 the Brazilian president Collor de Mello 
symbolically closed the secretly excavated well supposedly for nuclear military tests 
in the Amazonian region. In the same year Mello and Menem met each other in 
Iguaçu Falls renewing the nuclear treaties and the following year representatives from 
both countries went to Vienna to sign a joint agreement opening their installations for 
inspection by the IAEA (Goldman, 1991: 9). The far-reaching meaning of these 
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events was duly noted by contemporary observers. Paul Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer, 
from the Nuclear Control Institute in Washington, DC, opened the proceedings of a 
conference dedicated to the theme stating:12 
 
There have been few bright spots in the decades-old, uphill struggle to halt 
the growth of established nuclear arsenals and to stop the spread of new 
ones. Nuclear non-proliferation can be a very discouraging business. Thus, it 
is especially noteworthy when a region troubled by nuclear rivalry – in this 
case Latin America – beats all the odds and makes a breakthrough toward 
averting an arms race that most experts regarded as inevitable. 
 
The success of the implementation of these agreements led both countries to 
sign the Tlatelolco treaty. The history of the Tlatelolco treaty illustrates the tortuous 
way that led towards a Latin America free from nuclear weapons. Signed in 1967 by 
countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, it was intended as contribution 
“towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and 
towards strengthening a world at peace.”13 However, for years it risked being a dead 
letter as Argentina signed it, but did not ratify it, while Brazil signed and ratified it but 
declared that it only will follow it after all countries had adhered to it. 25 years later, 
as a consequence of the historical process we are discussing, the treaty was revived, 
with Argentina and Brazil accepting it in the early 1990s opening the way for Cuba to 
also adhere to it in the early 2000s. In the meantime, the treaty was updated to 
preserve the technological achievements of the countries, a requirement introduced by 
demands from Argentina and Brazil. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Leventhal & Tanzer (1992: 1). The conference was held in Montevideo, 11-13 
October 1989, and it was titled “Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race – 
New Prospects and Challenges for Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation.” 
13 For its full text, see http://www.opanal.org/opanal/Tlatelolco/Tlatelolco-i.htm. 
Accessed on 12 Nov 2013. 
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Brazilian and Argentinian presidents, twenty years after the agreement. From the left: 
Sarney, Lula, Kirchner, and Alfonsin 
 
Democracy was not the sole factor encouraging Brazil and Argentina to 
commit themselves to the pacific use of nuclear energy. American trade embargoes in 
the 1980s had motivated Brazilian companies to promote international inspections of 
Brazil’s nuclear facilities. However, the process that led both Brazil and Argentine to 
accept the UN’s international safeguards against nuclear weapons is rather unique. As 
we have seen the Argentine-Brazil agreement was first established in 1991, when two 
inspection agencies were set up on the initiative of these countries. Regional easing of 
tensions was therefore not imposed from abroad. Furthermore, the agreement 
officially established with the United Nation’s inspection agency, the IAEA, 
established a special set of “inspection rules” to prevent full disclosure of the 
enrichment facilities. (In the case of Brazil, the acquisition of the blue-print of the 
centrifuge for the Uranium-235 enrichment and the fast-speed valves were from 
unrevealed sources.) These “special rules” were accepted by the IAEA because Brazil 
was exercising its rights within the United Nation’s framework.  
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Further developments 
 
The nuclear programs of Argentina and Brazil are no longer a political issue. In both 
countries nuclear power reactors play a valuable role in electricity supply to the main 
cities. In the recent years, Brazil and Argentina have agreed to jointly build two 
nuclear research reactors. The atomic-power agencies from Brazil and Argentina 
signed an agreement to build two nuclear reactors for research and production of 
radioisotopes, a Brazilian Multipurpose Research Reactor (RMB) and the RA-10 in 
Argentina. This agreement meets the Bilateral Integration and Coordination 
Mechanism, established in the Joint Declaration of 2008 and signed by Presidents 
Cristina Kirchner and Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva. The atomic agencies of the two 
countries have collaborated closely since 2008. Argentina provides Brazil 30% of the 
Molybdenum 99 (Mo99) radioisotopes which are indispensable in the diagnosis and 
treatment of cancer.  
In both authoritarian and  democratic political systems science develops 
(Freire 2007). According to Heilbron (2003), the general rule is that “science, like 
most other social activities, does better when encouraged,” thus it is insensitive to 
political systems. The case of nuclear sciences in Argentina and Brazil corroborates 
this point as these activities were developed in different periods and political systems 
in these two countries. However, this case also shows us that under democratic 
systems there may be more social actors interested in the use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. This was the case with the democratic governments and scientific 
societies in both countries. 
We may conclude by saying that regional and national interests in addition to 
the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the 
building of trust between the two countries. Scientists from both countries were 
influential in obtaining such results. In these countries scientists were committed both 
to the pacific uses of nuclear energy and to the pursuit of autonomy in nuclear 
technology, which had been blocked by the countries who first dominated them. The 
kind of lesson to be drawn from this is related to what lies ahead. The current 
deterioration of international order could lead to the use of nuclear weapons in 
politically tense regions. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in 
the framework of worldwide cooperation and this cooperation is better developed 
when democratic regimes are in place. 
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